Why I am Agnostic, pt 2–causality

I mentioned, in a comment yesterday, that I had jumped the ship of theism about a year ago, and had somehow gotten caught up in trailing the ship for some time after that. The next few posts will discuss how those remaining ties were severed, and I’ll probably end with something on why I am not an atheist. (I think bloggers are suppose to have more firm ideas of where they are going with their posts, but I don’t operate that way)

When I first started moving beyond my theism, I still held to two definitions of God, the first as designer and the second as original cause. I know several of my emergent friends have remarked on the poverty of the proofs for God, but for some time the thought patter of Aquinas’ original cause sustained my ever decreasing belief in God. I viewed original cause as the stronger of these two arguments, yet now in retrospect, I think they are both weak in dissimilar ways. If you don’t hold to any notions or proofs of god (I think most theists do, they simply don’t acknowledge their reasoning as a proof), then this post really won’t do much for you; it’s simply a chronicle of my transitory state.

As to the theory of First Cause, this seems to be the natural standpoint of most Christians, especially those defending notions of young earth creationism, indeed it appears that any Christian that has had any sort of apologetics training immediately turns to Aquinas when faced with the question of God. I understand why, this argument appears to have a logical core which is strong enough to place tenuous belief upon, however, I see two lines of reasoning as to why this argument fails in the end.

The first, assuming that first cause was indeed true, the argument does not do anything but implicate a designer, and speaks nothing to the God of any religion. First cause could then, in essence, have simply been a completely evil entity (which would seem to make more sense, more on this later), it indeed does not require God to be good by any means of the term (though this does beg the Socratic “what is piety” argument). Thus, if taken as valid, the argument does not prove any conclusions regarding God other than the existence of an entity capable of existing outside of cause.

Second, the argument takes the assumption that there must be a cause to everything. This argument, at its core, requires a standpoint of hard determinism, which has fallen far outside of favor in more contemporary circles (of course, it is still strongly held within a large portion of Christianity itself), and clings strongly to the notion that everything must make sense. (Interestingly, those who hold to first cause then must shut the door on any sort of compatibilism, a point which, I’m sure, many of those I have carried this discussion with would refrain from admitting.) Without delving too deeply into the arguments of determinsim/compatibilism/free-will, I’ll simply state that the logical implications of such an argument (hard determinism) do not follow contemporary understandings of the workings of the world, and thus make a poor foundation for “god.”

I spent a bit more time on causality then I had originally intended (perhaps the amount of time was predetermined by a long chain of events that stem from a single cause, and all add up to writing six hundred words about cause?), so I’ll leave design for tomorrow. As always, comment away.

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  • D. Foster
    I don't think Aquinas' argument is legitimate either. So I really have nothing more to add on that point. If we simply change the Aquinas' implied, arbitrary proposition that the material Universe is "finite," and we say that the material Universe is actually "infinite," the whole argument breaks down. In my view, that's the end of that theory.

    As for design, I don't think that argument holds water either AS AN EMPIRICALLY TESTABLE THEORY.

    I think I've mentioned this before, but I make a distinction between dynamism (various parts moving about in a closed system) and complexity (various parts working together for some PURPOSE or FUNCTION within a closed system). A thing can become more dynamic without becoming more complex, but nit vice versa.

    To use simple examples to make the point, you can look at a watch and see that it is complex. You can also take apart the watch and throw the various pieces of it into a box and shake it. The way in which the pieces interact together in this box are dynamic, but not complex.

    If it can be demonstrated that the Universe is complex, and not merely dynamic, then I would say that there is proof of a designer. But that statement begs the question: if the Universe can be shown to have a purpose (since complexity entails purposefulness), then it has purpose. So how do we objectively distinguish between what things in the Universe are purposeful (both dynamic and complex) and what things are not purposeful (dynamic, but not complex).

    The answer? None. There is nothing in the sensual experience to which we can make an objective appeal to show that it is complex. We look at something like the body and it strikes us as meaningful because it serves a "purpose" in keeping us alive. But what is that "purpose"? It's a construct that we have created from looking at our own bodies and being enchanted by them. To call it "complex" is only to say, in any objective sense, that it means something TO US, not in an absolute sense.

    That's as far as Empiricist logic can take you and there is no proof of God within it. What I think Christians ought to argue--not because I think it can be rationally proven, but because I think it's common to all human experience (you'll probably disagree with this, but this is my view)--is that the purposefulness of the Universe is revealed to us as an experience in itself. The wonder and awe that is aroused in us by Nature, music, art, science, etc. is itself an insight into the nature of the Universe that is arbitrarily dismissed in favor of Empiricist assumptions; and not because the Empiricist assumptions are more objective, but because those assumptions are easier to adopt a priori at this point in time in a post-Enlightenment West.

    There's no objective reason that's appealed to in order to demonstrate the validity of these Empiricist assumptions except to say that to NOT hold to them makes for a disorderly world, which is a roundabout way of saying the same thing as Aquinas: we assume the world works in an orderly fashion. But now we're right back in the same basic Medieval assumptions that we began with.

    So when talking about whether God exists, it's really not about arguments and rationality and so forth at all, but from where you simply begin. There is argument for God. Everyone just starts from a different place when they ask, "Do I see a Power behind the Universe, or not?" Then they begin their logic on whatever foundation they see before them.
  • My argument (actually, Russell's argument, slightly modified) takes a bit of a different approach, having much more to do with theodicy, but I like your reasoning here.
    I question, then, if you think it's impossible to approach the basis of God in any sort of objective way? And I'm not sure I agree with your conclusion, I wanted there to be a God, yet came to a conclusion that I saw no evidence nor reason for a god.
  • Derek F.
    Just to add one more thing, in regards to your comment about your wanting there to be a God. This may itself be a pointer to something real. No desire in the Universe exists that cannot be satisfied. I am hungry because there is food and my body needs it; I'm thirsty because my body needs water; I want friends because my psyche desires companionship.

    However, I can also mistaken desires. Doctors say that many people experience thirst and they think it's hunger. I may feel experience anger from lack of sleep, but think that I want to blow the guy who cut me off on the highway. Every desire, even if misinterpreted, points to a need that is created by a lack of something that you want because you were made for it. And if Naturalism is true, then every need you have must be explained in terms of the total system. So if you want God and one doesn't exist, then you've simply mistaken a desire for something else as a desire for God. What you really want is food, or sex, or drugs, or some right combination of stimuli, and you've mistaken this desire as a desire for God, who you think will fulfill this desire.

    But what if there is nothing in the empirical world that satisfies this desire? Could this desire itself be a pointer to something (whatever It is) beyond the empirical world that some part of you needs? Just a thought.

    I think it also helps to recognize that, for the vast majority of people (myself included), that to say we have a desire for God is only partially true. We want a God that fits into our way of thinking. But you wouldn't want the Fundamentalist God to be real. Neither would I. And thankfully, I don't think he is. But I think this demonstrates that there is more at play in us than this pure, undiluted desire for God. We have our agendas, biases, likes and dislikes that work on our subconscience and tilt us one way or another, whether they're valid or not. For my, trying to bring these things to the forefront of my mind helps me to think through what I really believe a lot better. If they go unchecked, we feel ourselves tilting one way or another without really having a good reason for it. I have to struggle with this all the time. I'm sure you've already thought about this before, but I think it's a good thing to remember, nonetheless.
  • guess what, you just previewed my "why I'm not an atheist" argument. Great.

    Though, I do object to your Cartesian-esque view that that we cannot innately know something outside of ourselves, but I'll obviously touch a bit more on that later.
  • Derek F.
    I would say that not only is it impossible to approach God in an objective way, but it is impossible to approach anything at all in in an objective way--not even the keyboard I'm typing on.

    All experience is subjective, and therefore all beliefs (however "crazy") are equally valid from a purely objective standpoint because nothing can be shown to be absolutely true or false in an objective manner. Humanity has never resolved this, but simply (I think rightly) accepted certain things in their experience to be true and others as false. How do I know I exist? Because I experience my existence. It's not an argument, but an axiom that is assumed because I choose to accept the experience as valid.

    I also choose to accept that my sensual experiences are are rooted in a reality beyond my own perceptions--again, not because of an argument, but because it's apparent to me that this is the case. Pretty much everyone agrees on this point, so it isn't disputed, but that doesn't mean it's more true than anything else, it's just very common belief.

    It is equally apparent to me that there is a God, but not apparent like a sensual experience is apparent. What's apparent (in my view) is that the things I perceive in my sensual experiences are rooted in a meaning beyond my own personal perceptions--once more, not because of an argument, but because it is apparent to me that this is the case. I think that is far more common of a belief than is generally supposed, and that the problem most people have with accepting it is that we've internalized a Western, Empiricist philosophy that interprets everything we experience within a Naturalistic framework; so that our sensual experiences are labeled as "objective" and "real" things, and other experiences are labeled "subjective" and "non-real" things.

    This philosophy lends to the idea that my experiences of the empirical world are experiences of things "out there," outside of my mind, and that my other experiences (dreams, imagination, love, meaning, etc.) are happening "in here," inside of my mind.

    I would first point out, as a matter of fact and not simply opinion, that it's not really true that this is the case. I don't experience the empirical world "out there," but "in here," within my mind. I experience an impression, which comes to me from my brain, which came from an electrical signal in my nervous system, which came from my hand touching a table, and I simply believe that this impression is "real." But it's not happening "out there" anymore than a dream. If we're talking literally, it's all happening "in here." But scientists, working in the Empiricist paradigm, accept the senusal experiences as valid, and then create a concept called "the subconscious" to explain passivity with which we experience dreams, imaginations, emotions, etc.

    But what if that interpretation is incorrect? What if the imagination is a gateway to a world beyond the world? Why do we accept the paradigm that the West has given to us? This was the message of some of the Romantics in the post-enlightenment 19th century. Despite how flawed I think they were, I think this particular point was correct.

    The ease with which we dismiss experiences outside our sensual/empirical experiences is the result of the internalization of post-Enlightenment philosophy with which we have been conditioned to accept without critical thought. It's not objective, just convenient. When cross-examined, however, I think it turns out to be no better than anything else. It goes without saying that just because an idea is popular doesn't make it true. But I think that's what we do all the time in the West with this Empiricist paradigm, and I think we have to really engage and deconstruct that philosophy and open ourselves to other possibilities if we have any hope of finding what is true.
  • “I also choose to accept that my sensual experiences are rooted in a reality beyond my own perceptions--again, not because of an argument, but because it's apparent to me that this is the case.”

    Meh, solipsism was all I focused on last year.

    Anyways, in regards to sense/experience, I do cling to some modern levels of thinking, I do believe in pure experience (remember all my talk of Nishida?) that happens before interpretation, thus objectively (though Nishida would take it a step farther and say that pure experience is beyond even the objective/subjective divide, but that’s another argument for another day). I do not cling deeply to some pure empiricism, (And while I’m probably best labeled a positivist, I don’t actually think I am) and do open the door to true “fact” lying outside of sensory experience, I think pure objectivity is something out there, but something untenable by our innate subjectivity.

    Where was I going with this argument? I dunno, I’ll stop.
  • Derek F.
    I'm not sure what you meant by the allusion to Solipsism. But for clarification, I'm not a Solipsist. I believe that the impressions inside the mind correspond to an objective reality outside the mind. But I don't believe that this is the case because of an argument derived from deductive reasoning. My point is that pure discursive Reason, unaided by anything else, can only lead to a conclusion that is something like the Solipsist position, which I believe to be incorrect.

    As for the "pure experience," do you mean experience as it comes to us uneffected by our thoughts?

    In response to your other comment below (trying to keep discussion within one thread of comments), I would like to stress again that my argument is NOT that we can't know things outside the mind. I think we do. But Logic and Reason are unable to demonstrate any kind of absolute sense that this is the case.

    And is there a way to use an italics font on here? I keep resorting to caps lol
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